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Abstract:  
 
This article introduces the notion of ‘illegality regimes’ and argues that the creation, 
enhancement, and strengthening of these regimes has a transformative, and perhaps 
even corrosive effect on the meaning and value of citizenship itself. The notion of 
illegality regimes refers to the complex normative and policy framework that is either 
intended to, or otherwise has the effect of marginalizing or otherwise excluding 
irregular migrants, and to assist the authorities in the process of localizing and 
deporting them. Much of the political and scholarly attention in the context of illegality 
is focused on how illegality regimes affect migrants and refugees, how these regimes 
weaken their human rights, and generally run contrary to liberal principles such as 
equality before the law and non-discrimination. However, the objective here is to 
explore how it is not just the undocumented migrant that is directly or indirectly 
affected by the illegality regimes, but also regular migrants, asylum seekers, and finally 
full citizens themselves. The ways in which this happens is by a progressive 
transformation of what it means to be a citizen, and by means of a re-accommodation 
of the relation between the citizen and the state. As globalization unleashes migratory 
processes, the state adapts. Citizenship adapts along. 
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[W]e can think of citizenship as a type of natural experiment 
for observing how a highly formalized institution can undergo 
significant transformations without going under.1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This article argues that the creation, enhancement, and strengthening of strong 
illegality regimes has a transformative, and perhaps even a corrosive effect on 
the meaning and value of citizenship itself. Much of the political and scholarly 
attention in the context of illegality is focused on how illegality regimes affect 
migrants and refugees,2 how these regimes weaken their human rights,3 and 
generally run contrary to liberal principles such as equality before the law and 
non-discrimination.4 However, it is my objective to indicate how it is not just 
the undocumented migrant that is directly affected by the illegality regimes, but 
also regular migrants, asylum seekers, and finally full citizens themselves.5 The 
ways in which this happens is by a progressive transformation of what it means 
                                            
1 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton 
University Press 2006) 319. 
2 See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership 
(Princeton University Press 2006); Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What 
Globalization Means for Migration and Law (Cambridge University Press 2008); W.R. Brubaker, 
Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and America (University Press of America 
1989); D. Jacobson, Rights and Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1996). 
3 See, e.g., Barbara Bogusz, Ryszard Cholewinski, Adam Cygan, and Erika Szyszczak (eds)  
Irregular Migration And Human Rights: Theoretical, European And International Perspectives (Brill: 
Martinus Nijhoff 2004); David Hollenbach (ed), Driven from Home: Protecting the Rights of Forced 
Migrants (Georgetown University Press 2010); Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Tobias Kelley 
(eds), Are Human Rights for Migrants?: Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in 
Europe and the United States (Routledge 2011). 
4 See, e.g., Philip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration 
(Edinburgh University Press 2000). 
5 By full citizens I mean people with formal nationality, recognized according to the rules and 
procedures of the law of the state that grants it. I am not referring to the complicated contested 
cases, but to the people who, at least in theory, need not worry about the legality of their 
presence on the territory of 'their' state. 
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to be a citizen, and by a re-accommodation of the relation between the citizen 
and the state. As globalization unleashes migratory processes, the state adapts, 
and citizenship adapts along. 
This article starts by explaining the notion of an illegality regime, as a way of 
conceptualizing the overall logic and effect of a whole set of rules and policies 
aimed at marginalizing and excluding irregular migrants, or otherwise having 
that effect, and aimed too at localizing the undocumented, with a view to 
detaining and deporting them. The logic of illegality regimes is then further 
explored, as the article explains how these regimes are based on the assumption 
that everybody is potentially illegal. This involves the proliferation and 
intensification of moments of identity control. For illegality regimes to be 
effective in contemporary multi-ethnic societies that value non-discrimination, 
the control of identity control needs to be as pervasive and comprehensive as 
possible. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no significant 
racial dimension, an aspect that is further articulated in this article. In the 
second part I continue to develop a first overview of an analysis that explores 
how illegality regimes affect citizenship. This is done in a systematic way, taking 
into account the enormous diversity there is in the long history of theorizing 
about the citizen and her relation to others, as well as to the state and the 
political community as a whole. 
2. Illegality Regimes, Weak and Strong 
 
Most countries nowadays practice some type of immigration control.6 However, 
not all immigration control policies are created equal: they range between the 
very lax and the very strict. They may also employ a variety of different means 
of enforcement. Even the most lenient immigration regimes, however, include a 
category of people who are not allowed to be present in a country's territory 
and are therefore present 'illegally'.7 This might be a relatively small group of 
                                            
6 See, e.g., Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin and James Frank Hollifield (eds), Controlling 
Immigration: a Global Perspective (Stanford University Press 1994); Jeanette Money, Fences and 
Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control (Cornell University Press 1999); Jeroen 
Doomernik and Michael Jandl (eds), Modes of Migration Regulation and Control in Europe 
(University of Amsterdam Press: IMISCOE Reports 2008); 
7 This so called ‘illegality’ might be an actual crime or misdemeanor under domestic law, or it 
may not. The point is that the status of ‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented’ makes one the subject of 
the overall illegality regime. For sure, the term is controversial, for some the symbol of the 
moral fault of those who ‘break’ the law by trespassing into another state, while for others it is 
the symbol of how the state overreacts to what is essentially a systemic and social justice 
problem. This multiplicity in symbolic meaning wonderfully illustrates the underlying political 
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people or a relatively large group. How the state chooses to deal with this group 
is what I will refer to as its 'illegality regime'. However, I have chosen this term 
because it allows for an appreciation of the full extent of the states' 
preoccupation with and determination to mold society and its legal system to 
accommodate its drive to fight irregular immigration.  
This notion intersects and interacts with the similar but distinct notion of the 
‘deportation regime’, developed by Nicholas de Genova and others.8 One can 
see an illegality regime as subsumed within a more general deportation regime. 
In this perspective the deportation regime, as developed by de Genova and 
others, has a more Agambean9 signification than the notion of illegality regime 
that I want to develop here.  One can also see it in the opposite direction: a 
deportation regime is subsumed within the more general illegality regime, of 
which it forms a part. Analytically, the distinctiveness allows for a different 
focus. If a deportation regime focuses on how “the whole totalizing regime of 
citizenship and alienage, belonging and deportability, entitlement and 
rightlessness, is deployed against particular persons in a manner that is, in the 
immediate practical application irreducibly if not irreversibly individualizing”,10 
the notion of an illegality regime focuses on the accommodation of the entire 
sovereign and legal landscape to the figure of the illegal migrant. An essential 
purpose of the notion of an illegality regime is to argue that both illegality and 
deportation regimes do much more, and with much more systemic 
implications, than to perpetually threaten with deportation. Ultimately, I hope, 
both notions will be able to nourish each other. 
Illegality regimes can be lax, or strong, in various ways. First, the group of 
people affected by the regime can be either significant or marginal. Second, the 
state involved may care a lot about enforcing this regime, about tracking down 
and deporting the illegal migrants, or it may not care very much. It is in this 
second sense that I refer to illegality regimes as being 'strong' or 'lax', although 
                                                                                                                                  
tensions within the term and concomitantly, within illegality regimes themselves, and so I find 
it very useful for the purposes of this analysis. See generally, Dauvergne (n 2); Bill Ong Hing, 
‘The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers’ (1998) 9:1 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 
79; David Bacon, Illegal people: how globalization creates migration and criminalizes immigrants 
(Beacon Press 2008); Nicholas de Genova, ‘Migrant “Illegality” and Deportability in Everyday 
Life’ (2002) 31 Annual Review of Anthropology 419.  
8 See the various contributions to Nicholas de Genova and Nathalie Peutz (eds), The Deportation 
Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement (Duke University Press 2010). 
9 See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Daniel Heller-Roazen tr, 
Stanford University Press 2008); Giorgio Agamben, The State of Exception (Kevin Attell tr, 
University of Chicago Press 2005). 
10 Nicholas de Genova, ‘Theoretical Overview’, in de Genova and Peutz (eds) (n 8) 33, 34-35. 
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the first dimension will usually influence the development and strengthening 
(or not) of such a regime. 
States with weak illegality regimes devote very few resources to their 
enforcement. There are a number of possible reasons for this. It may be 
because the illegality regime is limited in scope, or the state does not draw 
many migrants, so the number of affected people is small or nonexistent. It may 
be that the number of affected people is large, but the state has different 
problems that it considers more important. It may be that the state accepts the 
presence of the irregular migrants because it believes that it benefits from 
them. Or it may be that the state would like to enforce its regime more strictly, 
but is generally weak, and therefore lacks the administrative resources for 
distinguishing between citizens and irregular aliens.11 
States with strong illegality regimes, by contrast, devote substantial resources to 
their enforcement.12 This can be because the state's illegality regime is broad in 
scope or because the state, for all types of reasons, attracts a large number of 
migrants, so the number of affected people is large. It may be that the state 
considers the problem of illegal migration very important. It may be that the 
state has very low tolerance for irregular migrants because it considers that they 
are a drain on its resources. Some combination of lax and strong policies may 
also occur, as a state may care more about some types of irregular aliens than 
others, or care about them in some contexts more than others, again for a 
variety of reasons. 
Of course, a state's position along this axis is not static: as conditions and 
priorities shift, states may choose to strengthen or weaken their illegality 
regimes. There are a number of reasons why states may choose to enhance or 
strengthen their illegality regimes. It may be that the number of irregular 
                                            
11 Wendy Brown argues that much of the loud and visible energy and resources that go to the 
construction of walls and other barriers, and that do not have any significant impact on the 
numbers of irregular migrants entering the state serves a symbolic function, by which the state 
is trying to compensate for its diminished relevance in times of globalization. See Wendy 
Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (Zone Books 2010). 
12 It is difficult to disentangle how many resources go to immigration control, especially when 
the actual tasks of immigration control are spread out over a large number of agencies and 
departments. The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) alone had a 2011 
budget of US$ 5.8 billion, while the 2011 budget for the US Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) is US$ 11.1 billion. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal 
Year 2011 <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/fy2011budgetinbrief.pdf> 
accessed 10 October 2011. Meanwhile, Frontex, which only coordinates the migration control 
efforts of the national authorities of EU member states spent around 80 million Euro in 2010. 
Frontex, 'Budget and Finance' <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/budget_and_finance/> accessed 
10 October 2011. 
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immigrants is perceived to increase, or actually increases. It may be that the 
state gains additional resources with which it can enforce its migration 
preferences. Alternatively, the political atmosphere in a country may shift, 
leading it to focus more closely on irregular migration.  
Conversely, a state may also choose to make its illegality regime more lax. It 
may be that the number of irregular migrants is perceived to decrease, or 
actually decreases. The state may lose resources, and be unable to enforce its 
regime. Or the political atmosphere in the country may shift, leading it to de-
emphasize migration in comparison with other priorities. 
These illegality regimes come in various forms and shapes and may be 
monitored and enforced by means of a number of mechanisms, with varying 
degrees of legality. They may focus on border control, such as in the building of 
walls or fences, 13 or they may involve more pervasive techniques of surveillance 
and monitoring. The stronger the illegality regime, the more it will focus on 
mechanisms of surveillance and control.14 This will be the case even if it still 
allocates many resources to border control mechanisms. In most democratic 
states under the rule of law, however, illegality regimes are primarily legal 
regimes. They are created by law and implemented by law enforcement 
agencies, even when much of the authority or actual responsibility for 
enforcement is delegated to private actors.15 
The fact that illegality regimes are legal regimes leads to something of a 
paradox: the 'illegality problem' is entirely the product of a state's decision to 
make irregular entry 'illegal'. As St. Paul understood, the law makes the sin.16 
When a state finds itself confronted with a situation in which the presence of 
irregular foreigners is, rightly or not, perceived as a problem of considerable 
priority, this presence becomes an illegality problem only once the state chooses 
to create and enforce an illegality regime. The scope of the state's illegality 
problem is thus directly related to the scope of its illegality regime. 
                                            
13 See generally Brown (n 11). 
14 See generally Dennis Broeders, Breaking Down Anonymity: Digital Surveillance of Irregular 
Migrants in Germany and the Netherlands (Amsterdam University Press 2009); Dennis Broeders 
and Godfried Engbersen, ‘The Fight Against Illegal Migration: Identification Policies and 
Immigrants' Counterstrategies’ (2007) 50 American Behavioral Scientist 1592; Huub 
Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer (eds), De Migratiemachine: De rol van technologie in het 
migratiebeleid (Van Gennep/Rathenau Instituut 2009).  
15 Gallya Lahav, ‘Immigration and the state: The devolution and privatisation of immigration 
control in the EU’ (1998) 24:4 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 675. 
16 St. Paul, 'St. Paul's letter to the Romans' ("sin is not imputed where there is no law."). 
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In some ways, therefore, there is nothing easier (even if politically difficult) 
than 'solving' the illegality problem: it is immediately eliminated when a state 
declares all migrants 'legal', or announces an amnesty. In this way, with one 
stroke of the pen, the problem of 'illegal' migrants disappears. This may be 
done incidentally or (very unlikely) permanently. Another option, however, is to 
allow an illegality regime to weaken, to phase itself out. The state can allocate 
fewer resources to its enforcement, use permitted discretion to make it more 
lax, or formally change the regime to diminish its reach. By the same token, if a 
state finds itself 'forced' for internal political reasons to address the migration 
issue and create, enhance or strengthen an illegality regime, it may also find 
that it is making the problem worse.17 
Let's imagine a state that has a 'big' irregular migration problem, in the sense 
that it affects a large number of people. This state decides to confront the issue 
by, gradually and in jerks, making its illegality regime stronger. How will it go 
about doing so? What are the mechanisms that it has at its disposal? Whether it 
proceeds by means of the old-fashioned, brutal methods associated with a 
police state, such as razzias and checks, or by more gentle or sophisticated 
means, what becomes important--or more important, or essential--is that this 
state must enhance its ability to distinguish between citizen and regular alien, on the 
one hand, and irregular alien on the other. In other words, illegality regimes will 
be primarily focused on 'finding the illegal'. 
This process of distinguishing legal from illegal has a number of important 
effects. In particular, as has been often pointed out and amply documented, 
strong illegality regimes push people into an increasingly difficult position, 
making irregular immigration more and more difficult, and increasing the cost 
for the potential migrant of being in an irregular status. As in other areas of 
illegalization, the purpose is not just to correct, but also to deter.18 In other 
words, they make regular status more important.  
For those who do not have access to 'legal' status, however, especially in cases 
where many people are affected, illegality regimes can lead to the creation of a 
                                            
17 In the absence of an illegality regime, and therefore of an illegality problem, a state may have 
a 'immigration problem'. It is a sign of the times that it is difficult not to translate an 
immigration problem into an illegality problem, and therefore to arrive at the almost inevitable 
'solution' to the problem, which is to create and develop an illegality regime. However, one may 
resist such a move and consider alternative perspectives that will lead to different approaches, 
responses, and/or 'solutions'. For instance, the social theorist Ulrich Beck, who has endorsed a 
'right to migrate', has proposed a legal regime that would regulate migration through varying 
tax-regimes. Ulrich Beck, 'Recht auf Migration' (Zeit Online, 12 May 2007)  
<http://www.zeit.de/online/2007/18/migration-beck> accessed 6 October 2011. 
18 Broeders & Engbersen (n 14). 
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society within a society.19 Marginalized irregular immigrants rely on each other 
and on others for their social, economic, and political needs. An industry of 
smugglers, also known as 'human traffickers', may develop to provide entry into 
the territory, and sometimes employment, too.20 A new economy in which 
irregular migrants can subsist will emerge and thrive, enhancing the already 
existing informal dimensions of the state's economy.21 The more important IDs 
become, the more lucrative the market for their falsification.22 The more 
difficult the access to social services, such as health, education, and housing 
becomes, the more lucrative (or morally compelling) it will be to provide them. 
In short, the more elaborate and forceful the illegality regime, the more 
autonomous and complex the 'gray' society and the illegal realm of the state 
will become.  
As such, there is a compulsive dimension to the dynamics of illegality regimes: 
created by the state to enhance control, they work to create elaborate areas 
outside of the state's control. The challenge of having to 'find the illegal' is 
produced by the process of 'seeking' them in the first place. In doing so, 
governments justify ever greater efforts to control this society within society. 
The more pervasive the society and economy that serves irregular migrants and 
their employers, the more illegality itself will be perceived as a problem that 
needs tackling. Problem and solution feed on each other, each one making the 
other bigger in a positive feedback loop. In the meantime, the difference 
between regular and irregular, legal and illegal becomes more and more 
important. 
2.1 Illegal and Potentially Illegal 
 
                                            
19 I do prefer this way of looking at things, rather than the perspective that sees irregular 
migrants as excluded from society. 
20 Raimo Väyrynen, for example, helpfully notes that 'illegal immigration and human 
smuggling, and even trafficking, are interrelated and result in a 'terrible paradox' ... the more 
strictly the laws of immigration against the illegal entrants are enforced, the more sinister forms 
of criminality are used in human trafficking to overcome barriers that are needed for making a 
profit.' Raimo Väyrynen, 'Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and Organized Crime' 
(United Nations University Discussion Paper No. 2003/72 2003) 5. 
21 There is a great deal of work on the operation of the informal economy in migrant enclaves. 
See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, 'The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old 
Regulations' (1994) 103 Yale Law Journal 2289. 
22 Not just fake resident status, but even fake citizenship. For example, the number of people in 
Malaysia with fake citizenship cards is estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands. 
     
 146 
The logic of a growing illegality regime that is increasingly eager to 'find the 
illegal' is to enhance the number of checkpoints in society. The first place this 
will happen is at the border. A strong border control system, with barriers and 
a competent border control agency with the ability to screen legal from illegal,23 
will form the initial 'line of defense'. The effectiveness of this border control 
system will be enhanced by all those elements that suggest the imagery of a 
fortress, and thereby preempt attempts to enter through the side or back door. 
This means the designation of valid points of entry,24 formal 'legal' entrances to 
a country, and the policing of the remainder of the boundaries, by land, sea, or 
air. Additionally, it may also entail the construction of physical barriers.25 These 
sites and metaphors serve to filter people on their way in, acting as a porous 
membrane to allow in those who are legal and keep out those who are not. 
This extensive infrastructure, this gigantic filter at the territorial edge of the 
state, is only the most visible physical manifestation of an illegality regime. In 
fact, it is but one expression of the logic of control that is at the heart of 
illegality. When a body enters a country, say at an international airport, there 
may be different lines or cues for nationals and visitors. Once one confronts a 
customs officer, however, every body is the same. This sameness is essential, 
because it means that everybody is potentially illegal, until proven otherwise. A valid 
passport or other ID is what gets you through the checkpoint at the airport, and 
legally into the country. The logic at the heart of an illegality regime is the logic 
of identity control.26 
This logic extends itself beyond the physical border and the physical 
checkpoint. A truly strong illegality regime has to deal with the fact that no 
matter how much it invests in border control, its boundaries are permeable and 
imperfect in keeping irregular migrants out. This may be because the border is 
too long and too hard to police for geographical reasons. It may also be because 
there are too many ways to enter on a temporary basis, and then overstay. 
Tourists, workers, students, and others may all abuse their rights to temporary 
entry. It may also be that because a state is very strict in terms of how it deals 
with asylum seekers, some will escape into the realm of illegality rather than 
wait to see their claims processed and denied. Some may abscond after 
                                            
23 With legal I refer to both citizens and regular migrants, with valid visa or residence status. By 
illegal I mean the people on the other side of the formal legal divide. 
24 See the Annexes to Schengen agreement, for an example of a (very long) list of formal places 
of 'entry' into the Schengen area. 
25 Brown (n 11). 
26 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cambridge 
University Press 2000). 
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rejection of their claims. In other words, there are many ways of entering a 
country, and staying there. 
Once they have crossed the border, and entered the metaphorical fortress, all 
of these people will walk the streets, looking for jobs and housing, opening 
bank accounts, buying cell phones, attending schools and making use of health 
care facilities. They will become the subjects of the internal border control 
problem. At this point, a state may choose to shrug its shoulders and let things 
be. Or, it may choose to tighten its illegality regime, and focus on these internal 
legal anomalies. They do this by trying to 'find the illegal', by intensifying the 
logic of the illegality regime, by increasing the number of checkpoints.  
Checkpoints are not necessarily posts manned by government officials. They 
are moments of identity control. They can be set up and operate in a variety of 
ways. Most commonly, they are translated into formal requirement to gain 
access to services and facilities, such as jobs and housing.27 The more of these 
types of checkpoints there are, the 'stronger' or more developed and 
sophisticated an illegality regime can be said to be. They are also ways to keep 
the direct costs of such a regime relatively low, since they do not necessarily 
require direct expenses by the state to carry out these controls. Instead, they 
distribute the task of identity control among the network of individuals 
performing these checks. By linking identity checks to as many services and 
facilities as possible, the regime closes the net around irregular migrants, 
isolates them, and effectively changes what it means to be inside a territory, by 
assimilating a regime of exclusion, an outside, into the jurisdiction of the state.  
The essential point here though is that once such an internal illegality regime is 
established, then just as at the airport, nobody is exempt from this control. 
Everybody is potentially illegal. 
The expansion of identity control may be justified on the grounds that it 
protects consumers or citizens from being mistaken for other people. For 
example, the requirement that a customer identify herself when opening a bank 
account may be justified on the grounds that it protects others by preventing 
her from opening a bank account in their name. Such justifications may be 
absolutely valid. However, they do not diminish their effect on illegality. 
Identity controls can serve multiple functions: they are not all about enforcing 
illegality regimes.28 But each set of controls does, whether intentionally or 
                                            
27 Broeders (n 14). 
28 David Lyon, Identifying Citizens: ID Cards as Surveillance (Polity Press 2009) 133 (describing the 
US Real ID system, which, though adopted in the context of enhancing national security and 
the 'war on terror', was also supported by the Heritage foundation and other anti-immigrant 
groups because of it restricted immigration through imposing harsher identification standards). 
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unintentionally, extend their reach. What is more, such controls are often 
explicitly focused on controlling illegality in addition to their other functions. 
Demanding the presentation of an ID as a requirement for basic transactions, 
such as opening bank accounts, has been an explicitly stated policy of legality 
control,29 and part of a strategy of raising the price and discomfort of irregular 
status for those whose presence in a country has not been formally approved.30 
2.2 Fault Lines of Racialization and Class 
 
Identity control, as a manifestation of systemic exclusion or differentiation, can 
of course happen in many ways. Countries with formally racist historical 
regimes, such as the United States and South Africa, did not need very 
elaborate or sophisticated mechanisms to filter desirable from undesirable 
people--the evidence was (often) right in front of their eyes.31 Similarly, in 
political regimes where ethnicity is an important category, such as that of Israel, 
screening processes can happen much more informally and loosely, or even 
voluntarily. However, in this genre of cases in which race and ethnicity are 
important categories there are usually other forms of segregation that operate 
in conjunction with the illegality regime. There might be designated territories 
to which the subordinated group is confined, as in the case of Israel and South 
Africa. Or, there might be a correlation between race/ethnicity and class, such 
as in the US or in most of Latin America, which comes with its own 
territorialized means of segregation. In these places the 'gray' society of the 
subordinated group functions openly and this is seen as part of the way things 
are, not as a problem in an of itself, since the 'real' problem, the presence of a 
particular group of people, is managed by means of territorialized segregation. 
It is not just that the segregation is embodied in the race or ethnicity of the 
excluded person, it is that the parallel society in which they live, with its 
schools and churches and dwellings, is not excluded from, but rather part of the 
segregated regime. 
                                            
29 However, some people argue that legality control is more of an excuse to expand the powers 
of the state. See, e.g., Johan van Someren, 'Mobiele vingerscan, verlengstuk van de 
identificatieplicht en de Paspportwet' (Vereniging Vrijbit, 8 August 2011) 
<https://www.vrijbit.nl/dossier/handhaving/politie-en-justitie/item/843-verlengstuk-van-de-
identificatieplicht-en-de-paspoortwet.html> accessed 10 October 2011.  
30 Broeders & Engbersen (n 14). 
31 Note, however, that apartheid laws needed more than a hundred pages to define the 
individual races.  
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Because of this, the paradoxical situation arises that those states that are the 
most multiracial and multiethnic, the most antiracist and egalitarian in terms of 
class, must also employ the most rigorous, sophisticated, and intrusive means of 
enforcing their illegality regimes. In other words, egalitarian and anti-racist 
societies with strong illegality regimes must be more indiscriminate in their 
enforcement, spreading the net as wide as possible and employing the most 
rigorous checks on the most different types of people. 
A lot of the political debate about the development of illegality regimes and the 
specific measures thereof is about how this might lead to instances of racial or 
ethnic profiling in circumstances of identity control. Recent years have seen a 
number of US states allowing police to verify the illegality status of any person 
who is part of some other inquiry.32 These regulations have been controversial, 
and elicited a great deal of protest.33 However, most political protests against 
these regimes of control have focused on how they will play out with respect to 
the Unitedstatesean politics of race.34 This nicely demonstrates the paradox 
described above: complaints that focus on the potential for 'racial profiling' are 
in some sense complaints that the illegality regime is not indiscriminate enough 
and should be applied more broadly. As such, and to put the finger on the irony: 
one of the hallmarks of a righteous egalitarian and truly anti-racist state to have 
a thoroughly indiscriminate and invasive illegality regime, in which everybody, 
independent of race, ethnicity, and class, can and in fact will be subjected to ID 
control. The best way of being indiscriminate is to make sure that everybody's 
identity is actually controlled, and the best way of being rigorous is to make 
sure that this control happens often. 
However, it seems likely that identity controls will nevertheless be selectively 
applied and enforced, with more controls taking place in some neighborhoods 
than in others, with some areas of economic activity, such as construction and 
                                            
32 See, e.g., the laws of Arizona, Georgia, Alabama, and others. Alabama House Bill 56; 2010 
Arizona Session Laws 113 (State Bill 1070) (the most significant and controversial parts of this 
bill were enjoined following a federal challenge on supremacy grounds); Georgia House Bill 87. 
33 Indeed, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and activist Desmond Tutu even cautioned that the 
Arizona law was the first step down the road to apartheid. Desmond Tutu, 'Arizona: The 
Wrong Answer' (Huffington Post, 29 April 2010) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/desmond-
tutu/arizona----the-wrong-answ_b_557955.html> accessed 10 October 2011. 
34 See, e.g., Kieth Aoki & John Shuford, 'Welcome to Amerizona--Immigrants Out: Assessing 
Dystopian Dreams and Usable Futures of Immigration Reform, and Considering Whether 
Immigration Regionalism is an Idea Whose Time has Come' (2010) 38 Fordham Urban Law 
Journal 1; Andrea Christina Nill, 'Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and 
Disenfranchisement' (2011) 14 Harvard Latino Law Review 35; Mary Romero, 'Are Your Papers 
in Order?: Racial Profiling, Vigilantes, and "America's Toughest Sheriff' (2011) 14 Harvard 
Latino Law Review 337. 
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catering, more often investigated, with more emphasis on urban areas than on 
rural areas, and so on. In this way, existing class structures based on income, 
ethnicity, etc. will be reinforced as some groups bear the brunt of the illegality 
regime.35  
Even so, everybody will be affected by strong illegality regimes, as its main 
manifestation is not that of officers in the street, but of building check points 
into an increasing number of moments in the daily life of citizens. These check 
points will be manned by a growing number of private individuals.  
3. Citizenship Transformed 
 
As explained above, a strong illegality regime makes formal citizenship, or at 
least some degree of legal status, more important. However, this importance is 
not necessarily a blessing. It means that formal citizenship becomes more 
necessary, and that its absence becomes more consequential.36 It means that 
citizenship is haunted by a Sword of Damocles, for being a citizen no longer 
provides certainty, as an intrinsic part of one's political identity in the world at 
large, but becomes instead a status that entails a degree of constant anxiety. It 
also means that any confusion about one's citizenship, such as mistaken 
identity, or loss of ID through carelessness or theft, is even less of a laughing 
matter and becomes an urgent problem, for without proof of legal status 
ordinary life loses many of its comforts. Where illegality regimes are rigorously 
enforced, citizenship becomes something that you can never leave home 
without. Instead of being a formal status, which brings with it important but 
mostly symbolic rights such as the right to vote or to hold public office, it 
becomes the key to your most basic needs, such as the ability to buy a house, to 
have a job, to set up internet access, and so on. From a badge of honor, shown 
during the festive moments of the life of the body politic, citizenship becomes 
                                            
35 Michael Wishnie, 'State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws' (2004) 6:5 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1084, 1113 (describing the US 
Immigration and Naturalization Service's selective enforcement of immigration rules on those 
who were speaking Spanish, listening to Spanish music, or had a Hispanic appearance). 
36 As Hannah Arendt argued, because rights are not ‘natural’ but a construction of society, they 
are fundamentally attached to an individual’s membership in the political realm. To the extent 
that this membership is marked by citizenship status, citizenship becomes a matter of crucial 
importance. ‘[N]ot the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able 
to guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity which has befallen ever-increasing 
numbers of people. Man it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his 
essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from 
humanity’. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt 1968) 297. 
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the object of constant scrutiny and mistrust. In a weak illegality regime, you 
may never need of a passport, or other ID, if you never travel abroad. Under a 
strong illegality regime, however, your ID is the thing that gives you access to a 
'normal' (legal) life. Moreover, the more pervasive the identity controls imposed 
by an illegality regime, the more you will be held hostage not just to your 
citizenship, but also to the formal and tangible evidence thereof, the ID. As 
one's citizenship becomes more and more important, the person underneath 
that citizenship will start to melt away; from a person with citizenship, you 
become close to nothing without it.  
3.1 Theories of Citizenship 
 
This dynamic engages most of the traditional theories of citizenship. Theories 
about citizenship abound and are as old as political philosophy and/or law.37 
They range from the so-called republican approaches that emphasize the 
connection between citizenship and participation in the realm of politics, and 
which focus on the arena of political engagement38; through Liberal approaches 
that are built around law and rights, and have a cosmopolitan or universalist 
vocation39; through communitarian approaches that emphasize cultural 
belonging and community40; to radical pluralistic approaches that offer the 
                                            
37 For one famous historical overview, see J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Ideal of Citizenship since 
Classical Times’ (1992) 99 Queen’s Quarterly 35. See also Derek Benjamin Heater, Citizenship: the 
civic ideal in world history, politics and education (first published 1990, 3rd edn, Manchester U. 
Press 2004); Gershon Shafir (ed), The Citizenship Debates: A Reader (University of Minnesota 
Press 1998). 
38 See e.g., Aristotle, The Politics (T.A. Sinclair tr, Penguin 1962); Arendt (n 36). For neo-
republican theories that seek to update republicanism for the modern era, see Adrian Oldfield, 
Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World (Routledge 1990); Michael J. 
Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Harvard 1996); Robert 
D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon & Schuster 
2000). 
39 See, e.g., John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness, Political not metaphysical’ (1985) 14 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 223; Jurgen Habermas,  ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on 
the Future of Europe’ (1992) 12 Praxis International 1. 
40 See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Basic Books 1983); Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of 
Recognition’ in Amy Gutman (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 
(Princeton University Press 1994); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (OUP 1996). 
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image of a differentiated citizenship, one in which any identity can find its 
place.41 
These theories of citizenship are the products of enveloping narratives of 
political and legal ideas of community and state. These narratives offer both a 
normative background as well as a factual account of the life of the state, its 
sovereignty, its subjects, and their legal and political status. As such, when we 
speak of citizenship, we are not talking about a fixed or uncontested institution, 
let alone a too formally defined one.42 
Theories about citizenship are seen here as interventions into debates about 
what the best and most accurate account is about what is going on in the life of 
the contemporary state of affairs. For the purpose of this project this article will 
offer such an account, but one that is centered around a phenomenological 
exploration of the social practices that constitute citizenship, and how it is 
embedded in legal rules about rights as well as about duties, and about 
competences and jurisdiction. This account has normative dimensions, but 
these are backgrounded, sacrificed in the attempt of figuring out how the 
chimera of citizenship is affected by illegality regimes. 
3.2 Under siege: citizenship as protection 
 
Citizenship, then, can be many things. And in each of its guises, it is both 
produced and affected by the presence of illegality regimes.  
To begin with, citizenship can be understood as a form of protection.43 Illegality 
regimes are justified in a number of ways: by reference to economic stability 
                                            
41 See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of 
Universal Citizenship’ (1989) 99 Ethics 250. 
42 As Judith Shklar has written, ‘There is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, 
[yet] none more variable in history, or contested in theory’. Judith N. Shklar, American 
Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Harvard U. Press 1991) 1. Kivisto and Faist give a sense of 
this when they list the “proliferation of adjectives” that characterize citizenship literature. Peter 
Kivisto & Thomas Faist, Citizenship: discourse, theory, and transnational prospects (Blackwell 2007) 
2-3. Contestation over this term goes back a long way: ‘The nature of citizenship … is a 
question which is often disputed; there is no general agreement on a single definition’. 
Aristotle (n 38) 93. 
43 As the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan once asserted, 'every human-made boundary on the earth's 
surface--garden hedge, city wall, or radar 'fence'--is an attempt to keep inimical forces at bay. 
Boundaries are everywhere because threats are ubiquitous.' Yi-Fu Tuan, Landscapes of Fear 
(University of Minnesota Press 1979) 6. 
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and/or welfare,44 by reference to cultural homogeneity or social cohesion,45 or 
by reference to a combination of security and criminality concerns. In each of 
these stories, illegal migration is constructed as an invasion, as hordes of people 
'breaking the law'.46 Though the language of formal illegality rules and the 
rhetoric surrounding the rise of illegality regimes on the political agenda may 
differ,47 the instruments used to enforce them are generally fixed. These involve 
very visible measures of police or administrative measures, the construction of 
physical barriers,48 and the deployment of a variation of stealth controls by 
labor inspectors and other administrative inspections.49 The detention of 
irregular migrants equates them with criminals, holding them in detention 
centers that are, like prisons, designed to keep people in and prevent them 
from disappearing into the population.50  
Whether draconian or lenient, however, illegality regimes are ultimately 
justified and implemented as a response to a threat or even a danger. Physical 
manifestations of citizenship, such as an ID card or passport, are now required 
not only to give access to territory or consular assistance abroad, or for the 
                                            
44 See, e.g., Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster 
(Random House 1995) 137-177. 
45 David Miller, for example, worries that the presence of foreigners might put social democracy 
at risk because social democracy requires a unity of community and purpose. David Miller, On 
Nationality (OUP 1995). 
46 A number of scholars have commented on the military language used to describe 
immigration. In one interesting study, Leo Chavez describes the militaristic costumes and 
props used by the Minutemen vigilante border patrol groups in the United States, and 
examines the way that these performative strategies reinforce the narrative of invasion. Leo R. 
Chavez, 'Spectacle in the Desert: The Minuteman Project on the US-Mexico Border' in David 
Pratten and Atreyee Sen (eds) Global Vigilantes (Hurst Publishers 2007). 
47 For example, though seldom actually so implemented, political debates sometimes make 
reference to the use of the military in pursuing irregular migrants. Physical walls can, in this 
sense, be seen as deploying military means (walls) without deploying the actual military. The 
big exception though is the patrolling of waterways and maritime borders, which is done by 
actual military components of the state: navies.  
48 P. Andreas, ‘Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century’ (2003) 28 
International Security 78; Phillip Cole, ‘The American Fence: Liberal Political Theory and the 
Immorality of Membership’ in Gideon Calder, Phillip Cole & Jonathan Seglow (eds), Citizenship 
Acquisition and National Belonging: Migration, Membership and the Liberal Democratic State 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2010); Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (MIT Press 2010). 
49 What Broeders and Engbersen call ‘weapons of mass detection’. Broeders and Engbersen (n 
14) 1593. 
50 See generally M. Welch, Detained: Immigration Law and the Expanding INS Jail Complex 
(Temple University Press 2002); Mary Bosworth, 'Border Control and the Limits of the 
Sovereign State' (2008) 17 Social and Legal Studies. 
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exercise of voting rights. They also serve as a symbol of the efforts of the state 
to protect the integrity of its territory, and the economic and social welfare 
enjoyed by its citizens. In the weak version, citizenship serves to protect 
citizens' access to their 'birthright', to the spoils collected by previous 
generations.51 In the stronger version, citizenship serves to protect the 
privileges themselves, by ensuring, through the operation of illegality regimes 
and restrictive immigration policies, that economic welfare and social cohesion 
are maintained. 
However, there is a more concrete dimension to this protection. Citizenship, in 
its material expression, serves to protect subjects from suspicion and prevents 
their exclusion from everyday activities such as getting a job or health 
insurance. This protection, however, is only necessary because of the illegality 
regime itself, which cordons off large proportions of public life. The logic is 
therefore circular: citizenship protects the public from the dangers of illegality, 
which are themselves the product of the citizenship regime. 
3.3 Belonging: citizenship as membership 
 
Citizenship can also be about membership and belonging, and illegality about 
strengthening this community.52 Citizenship here is about what connects 
subjects to the body politic, what connects them to one another. To be a citizen 
means to share in the sovereignty over the state of affairs.53 Illegality regimes 
can be seen as aiming to increase the value of these connections, to close them 
off from cultural contamination, to root the political community in the territory, 
and to make sure that only those selected to enter into the political community 
                                            
51 See Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirschi, ‘Citizenship as Inherited Property’ (2007) 35 Political 
Theory 253. 
52 Michael Walzer, for example, sees citizenship as about protecting communities: ‘The theory 
of distributive justice begins, then, with an account of membership rights. It must vindicate at 
one and the same time the (limited) right of closure, without which there could be no 
communities at all, and the political inclusiveness of the existing communities’. Walzer (n 40) 
63. 
53 As Walzer writes, ‘we who are already members do the choosing, in accordance with our own 
understanding of what membership means in our community and of what sort of a community 
we want to have. Membership is a social good is constituted by our understanding; its value is 
fixed by our work and conversation; and then we are in charge (who else could be in char?) of 
its distribution’. Walzer (n 40) 32. ‘Citizenship, conventionally understood, marks full and 
permanent membership in a political community; … it defines the circle of our greatest trust 
and of our most extensive common endeavors’. Peter H. Schuck, ‘Citizenship in a Post-9/11 
World: An Exchange Between Peter H. Schuck and David Cole’ (2007) 75 Fordham Law 
Review 2531, 2534. 
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by the appropriate procedures can actually do so.54 Thus, illegality regimes are 
meant to strengthen the connection of citizens to the body politic; to extend the 
reach of the political community to more areas of life, such as renting an 
apartment or even getting a bank account. Citizenship becomes important in all 
sorts of places where it never was before.55 As the external lines of the public 
realm are made stronger, the connection among those who have access and are 
part of the community may increase as well. 
At the same time as they strengthen some community ties, however, these lines 
cut straight through others. This happens as individuals are separated by 
ethnicity and national origin, dividing up those immigrants with legal status 
from those without.56 And it happens geographically too, with effects that are 
accommodated territorially. As described above, illegality regimes create 
localities and sites where underground markets and service providers are more 
densely concentrated. This process, too, is circular: illegality regime creates 
sites with increased illegality. These sites are not the exclusive domain of 
irregular migrants, but are shared by other groups, often groups that are 
themselves at the margins of the public realm and the body politic. Illegality 
regimes increase the distance between center and periphery within a 
community, and, as such, change the economy between cohesion and division, 
not necessarily in desirable ways. 
Just as with 'citizenship as protection', then, the notion of 'citizenship as 
cohesion' sets up an illegality regime that ends up undermining its goals in the 
name of promoting them. The way in which this happens is via the slow but 
relentless development of an illegality regime that feels that it needs to reach 
further and intrude deeper into the fabric of social life. The more citizenship 
operates as an anxious overcoming of a constant distrust about ones 
membership and overall legality, the less it can comfortably function as a 
symbol of belonging to a political community. In short, by becoming more, 
citizenship becomes less.  
3.4 Vita activa: citizenship as engagement with the body politic 
 
                                            
54 The rise of language and ‘shared values’ tests for newcomers is evidence of this conception of 
citizenship. See Sue Wright, ‘Citizenship Tests in Europe’ (2008) 10 International Journal of 
Multicultural Studies 1. 
55 For example, a few supermarkets in Amsterdam only accept electronic payment, using debit 
accounts, for which you need a bank account, for which you need some type of regular status 
56 It inevitably will divide couples, lovers, and families too. 
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A third way of seeing citizenship is as a sign of political engagement. Illegality, 
understood through this paradigm, is intended to protect the exclusive nature 
of the political realm. 
Especially in the republican tradition, citizenship is concerned with the 
capacity and desirability of engaging in the realm of politics. In contemporary 
societies, there are a number of formal and less formal institutions that aim to 
facilitate this engagement, including the different elements and levels of the 
state (local, regional, national), non-state organizations, and civil society in 
general. Each national culture has informal dimensions too, which might 
include disruptive public demonstrations, or mobilization through radical or 
fringe political parties. All this and much more is part of the social organizing 
of political engagement that is part of the institution of citizenship.57 
In order to be meaningful, however, this citizenship must be limited to those 
who are both prepared and capable of participating in the public sphere. 
Illegality regimes are thus put in place to cordon off the realm of political life, 
and to ensure that the arena of public engagement is only accessible to formal 
citizens. That is, that only those with the right and capacity to do so can engage 
as equals in political life.58 
At the same time, though, the means and techniques used to enforce an 
illegality regime in this paradigm work to undermine political engagement. The 
degree to which this happens depends very much on local circumstances, 
formal and informal political cultures, and the nature of the illegality regime 
itself, as well as on the 'size' of the perceived illegality problem. One can 
imagine situations in which a relatively weak illegality regime would continue to 
allow engagement and participation in all types of formal and informal political 
and judicial procedures. But, one can also imagine situations in which a very 
                                            
57 As Michael Sandel describes it, ‘the republican tradition emphasizes the need to cultivate 
citizenship through particular ties and attachments. More than a legal condition, citizenship 
requires certain habits and dispositions, a concern for the whole, an orientation to the common 
good. But these qualities cannot be taken as given. They require constant cultivation. Family, 
neighborhood, religion, trade unions, reform movements, and local government all offer 
examples of practices that have at times served to educate people in the exercise of citizenship 
by cultivating the habits of membership and orienting people to common goods beyond their 
private ends.’ Sandel (n 38) 117. 
58 This type of cordoning off will also exclude non-citizens with legal status. Michael Sandel 
justifies this exclusivity as flowing from the ‘special demands of republican citizneship’. As he 
puts it: ‘If sharing in self-rule requires the capacity to deliberate well about the common good, 
then citizens must possess certain excellences—of character, judgment, and concern for the 
whole. But this implies that citizenship cannot be indiscriminately bestowed. It must be 
restricted to those who either possess the relevant virtues or can come to acquire them’. Sandel 
(n 38) 318. 
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strong or repressive illegality regime leads to situations in which a large 
number of people are denied access to formal and informal legal and political 
channels. If this is the case, such an illegality regime will basically create new 
forms of politics, primarily in the informal realm,59 but perhaps in ways that 
openly defy existing political and legal structures of citizenship in the sense of 
the dynamics of political engagement. This may be a good thing in and of itself, 
but it may also be potentially destabilizing. In its quest to delimit and thereby 
protect public life, therefore, illegality regimes can end up eliminating pathways 
for political engagement and creating separate, privatized spheres of social 
action that are disengaged from the broader public world. 
3.5 Guarantees: citizenship as having rights 
 
Citizenship has acquired, in the last fifty or so years, perhaps the most 
sophisticated legal and institutional environment it has ever had. This has 
happened primarily through the framework of human rights and through the 
ways in which rights discourse is part and parcel of the entire legal institutional 
edifice. Since their introduction as political rights, human rights have 
enshrined the most important aspects of what citizenship means:60 equality, 
individual autonomy, access to legal and political institutions, etc. They have 
not only been the objectives in various emancipatory struggles, such as voting 
rights for women, basic social rights for the poor; they also have created 
institutional mechanisms to achieve these results.61 Moreover, notions of what 
citizenship means have followed a trajectory that has been closely connected to 
theoretical, doctrinal, and legislative developments in human rights. For 
example, social rights and cultural rights have been developed in periods when 
the issues of social solidarity and cultural identity were polemical points of 
                                            
59 See, e.g., Anne McNevin, Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and the New Frontiers of the 
Political (Columbia UP 2011); E.C. Hughes, ‘Bastard Institutions’ in L. Coser (ed), Everett C. 
Hughes on Work, Race, and the Sociological Imagination (first published 1951, Chicago U. Press 
1994); S.J. Mahler, American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins (Princeton 1995); Broeders 
& Engbersen (n 14). 
60 T.H. Marshall provided one influential statement of this conception of citizenship as rights 
just after World War II. T.H. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (1950) in T.H. Marshall, 
Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Anchor 1965). And Hannah Arendt, famously, defined 
citizenship as the ‘right to have rights’. Arendt (n 36). See also Simon Szreter, 'The right of 
registration: Development, identity registration, and social security--a historical perspective' 
(2007) 35 World Development 67 (arguing for a human right to identity registration, which would 
help ensure that all individuals have access to civil and political rights). 
61 For Marshall, for example, full citizenship requires a liberal-democratic welfare state that can 
guarantee civil, political and social rights to every member of society. Marshall (n 60). 
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articulation in the broader discussions about citizenship and about the relation 
between the state and its citizens.62 
As human rights institutions grew in strength and authority, they came to be 
perceived as guarantors of the basic rights of citizens, to the point of offering a 
check on the power and authority of the (democratically elected) legislature. In 
this way, they have contributed to the construction of citizenship as a set of 
guarantees, enshrined in rights that are legally enforceable, if necessary against 
the grain of democratically articulated will.63 
A paradox ensues. An illegality regime puts significant pressure on this reliance 
and on the function of a human rights framework in general, even if at the same 
time it seems to continue its job unscathed. For one, recent decades have seen 
a fairly meek response by human rights institutions to the claims of migrants in 
general, and to the claims of irregular migrants in particular. The general 
argument goes like this: "As a general principle of international law, it is at the 
discretion of the State to grant entry to its territory to non-nationals. However 
in exercising control of their borders, States must act in conformity with their 
international human rights obligations. In certain specific categories of cases, 
States may be required by international law to permit a migrant to enter or 
remain: where a migrant meets the criteria for refugee status, or complementary 
protection; or where entry to the territory is necessary for purposes of family 
reunification."64 In fact, human rights institutions have supported the general 
idea, explained above, of a state under siege, of a state that needs protection 
against the phenomenon of migration in general, and irregular migration in 
particular.65 The reasons mentioned above have in fact been the justification of 
                                            
62 Marshall (n 60). 
63 As Seyla Benhabib notes, ‘cosmopolitan norms enhance the project of popular sovereignty 
while prying open the black box of state sovereignty. They challenge the prerogative of the state 
to be the highest authority dispensing justice over all that is living and dead within certain 
territorial boundaries. In becoming party to many human rights treaties, states themselves 
‘bind’ their own decisions.’ Seyla Benhabib, ‘Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of 
Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times’ in Heather Gautney et al. (eds) 
Democracy, States, and the Struggle for Social Justice (Routledge 2009) 82. 
64 International Commission of Jurists, Migration and International Human Rights Law 
(International Commission of Jurists 2011) 43.  
65 Since the Abdulaziz case, the European Court of Human Rights has always started its analysis 
of cases related to migration with a reiteration of a state's sovereign right to control entry to its 
territory; protecting the domestic labor market was cited as one possible legitimate justification. 
Par. 78 of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. The United Kingdom, European Court of Human 
Rights, Appl. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81; Judgment of 28-05-1985; published in Series A-94. In 
this, and to deal with irregular migration, the European Court has also allowed states to use 
coercive measures, such as detention. See generally Galina Cornelisse, Immigration Detention and 
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the human rights institutions: social cohesion and economic welfare. As such, 
illegality regimes carry the general seal of human rights approval. 
However, the construction of an illegality regime also means that a state has to 
limit some of the rights of its citizens, such as the right to privacy, in its quest to 
verify everybody's legal status.66 The rights of citizens are vulnerable to this in 
the same way that they are vulnerable to an anti-terrorism regime. This 
limitation of some rights in the context of counter-terrorism however, is 
nothing compared to the limitations endured by aliens and by irregular 
migrants. This fissure in the general framework of equality generally 
guaranteed by human rights frameworks can, however, mean that the standard 
of normality changes. The degree of protection and guarantee is now measured 
by reference to the inferior level of protection enjoyed by irregular migrants.67 
This shift in turn raises the stakes of being confused with irregular migrants, 
either by error or by bad intentions.68 
Finally, illegality regimes tend to increase the amount of power, authority and 
competences in the hands of the public administration: that is, increasing the 
power in the hands of the executive, and decreasing the power of the 
judiciary.69 Whereas the criminal law system has a long tradition of checks and 
guarantees, the administrative law system in many countries is not really 
designed to deal with the tracking down, rounding up, and deporting of 
                                                                                                                                  
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2010). In the words of Catherine Dauvergne, supra note 3 at 21: 
"human rights norms have done little to assist illegal migrants." 
66 See Conor Friedersdorf, 'Why Alabama's Immigration Bill is Bad for Citizens' The Atlantic (13 
June 2011). 
67 Beyond civil and political rights, one can see the downward effect or pressure that illegality 
produces on labor standards and on wages. 
68 There is the famous case of Vivian Solon, an Australian citizen who was deported to Manila, 
where she had been born, after being unable, due to mental health problems, to adequately 
explain her situation to the immigration authorities. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vivian_Solon (last accessed 10 October 2011). Then there is also 
the growing practice of Dutch authorities to put under immigrant detention demonstrators who 
refuse to identify themselves. This administrative detention does not require a formal criminal 
law charge and can last up to eighteen months. See Juan M. Amaya-Castro, 'Tegenwoordig ben 
je hier illegaal tot het tegendeel is bewezen', De Volkskrant (6 August 2011) 36. 
69 See, e.g., Donald S. Dobkin, 'The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for 
Lawlessness' (2008) 17:3 Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 362 (describing the increase 
in administrative power that came along with the Bush administration's increased focus on 
immigration as a security threat). 
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thousands of people. In short, an illegality regime affects the very realm of law 
designed to regulate relations between citizens and the state.70 
3.6 The world: citizenship as universal equality 
 
Increasingly, the idea of democratic states fulfilling the promise of making the 
way for a humanity in which all are equal is coming under pressure.71 In this 
promise, citizenship based on democratic institutions and equality was not just 
a birthright for the happy few, but the promise that the rule of law and 
democratic rule held out to humanity.72 Egalitarian and democratic citizenship 
has been constructed as the West's claim to universal moral, legal, and political 
authority. Even recently, when we have seen a surge in illegality regimes, 
democracy and egalitarianism are held out as evidence of Western superiority, 
for other countries to emulate. However, this idea is coming under pressure as 
these same states start treating citizenship as a birthright and as a privilege, and 
not as the West's gift to mankind. Having growing numbers of people being 
excluded from the regular political, social and cultural life of a body politic can 
of course be ignored, but only for so long as politics of defiance and visibility 
are suppressed. In short, it is very difficult not to see states with strong illegality 
regimes as not being discriminatory and repressive states, even if their illegality 
regimes as such are designed to be indiscriminate. As birthright and privilege 
become stronger elements in the conception of citizenship, equality and non-
discrimination give way.73 In this way, the idea of citizenship as a manifestation 
of universality is undermined, while the idea of citizenship as the exclusionary 
politics of privilege is enhanced. 
                                            
70 An interesting general case is made in favor of the notion of citizenship over the 
institutionalized one of human rights by Paulina Tambakaki, Human Rights, or Citizenship? 
(Birkbeck 2011). 
71 In this sense, scholars such as Yasemin Nohoglu Soysal have written of the development of a 
‘postnational’ citizenship that ‘challenges the predominant assumption, both scholarly and 
popular, that national citizenship is imperative to membership in a polity’. Yasemin Nohoglu 
Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (U. of Chicago Press 
1994) 3. 
72 Martha Nussbaum, for example, recently declared herself a ‘citizen of the world’, arguing that 
‘If we really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain 
inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception requires us to 
do with and for the rest of the world’. Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ 
(1994) Oct.-Nov. Boston Review. 
73 Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard UP 2009). 
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4. Concluding: the checkpoint, citizenship and suspicion 
 
It is important to keep in mind that we are not merely talking about a symbolic 
dimension in which citizenship means one thing or another, even if this 
dimension is highly relevant in the context of developments in law and legal 
doctrine. Moreover, it is also not about merely referring to these legal and 
doctrinal accommodations of illegality regimes, even if this legal formalization 
of surveillance and checkpoint practices is a fundamental piece of the puzzle. 
What is at the core of this argument is the sweeping transformation of our 
political and therefore our physical environment by technologies that allow for 
mass surveillance and continuous control,74 as well as for the linking together of 
the growing flows of information collected by the state.75 It is these 
technologies, as much as the various developments that trigger migratory flows 
themselves, that imposes itself as the new material environment in which 
citizenship acquires concrete significance in the experience of its subjects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
                                            
74 Lyon (n 28). 
75 See generally, Benjamin Muller, Security, Risk and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and 
Bodies (Routledge 2010). 
